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AUTHORITY’S LAST STAND: 
Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Albany’s 
Tumultuous Sixties 
 
By: Calley Quinn 
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In 1970, a mainline Protestant in the Capital Area Council of Churches officially reached his 
breaking point. “Students in vast numbers have risen in rebellion against conventional American 
society,” Reverend Frank Snow stated to fellow Council members, “…. The crisis, as we all know from 
observation, if not from personal experience, is real.”1 Serving as head campus minister for the State 
University of New York at Albany, Snow could not handle counseling one more student concerned with 
the Vietnam War and conscription laws. He made it very clear in the Annual Report of the Capital Area 
Council of Churches that he was far from pleased with the current situation on campus. Several miles 
down the road, Bishop William Scully of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany had avoided the 
University altogether. He chose to delegate Catholic ministry to the Newman Club, a Catholic student 
organization. Clearly the two clergymen had disagreeing approaches to campus unrest, but times were 
rapidly changing and both wanted to maintain whatever religious authority they had left.  
Despite the differences between Reverend Snow and Bishop Scully, their reactions were equally 
motivated by a perception of declining authority – a harsh reality confronting many American 
institutions in the 1960’s. Moral issues with birth control, race issues with the Civil Rights Movement, 
and campus unrest over the Vietnam War all represented social change that threatened conventional 
institutional authority. The federal government and higher education faced immense scrutiny from Baby 
Boomers (those born between 1946 and 1964) that resulted in their significantly weaker state by 1970. 
Yet, a similar experience was seen locally. As was the case with Reverend Snow and Bishop Scully, 
anyone associated with institutional authority was going to be challenged by the “question authority” 
ethos of young Americans. Moreover, while Snow was involved with rioting college students and Scully 
ignored it altogether, neither clergyman could mitigate the loss of their local authority, reflecting the 
difficulty of maintaining authority at all levels in the 1960’s. 
                                                          
1 “Annual Report 1969- 1970,” 1970. Capital Area Council of Churches Records, 1941-2012, Series 1: Administrative Files, Box 1, 
Folder 22, University at Albany M.E. Grenander Special Collections and Archives. CACC Records and Grenander archives will be 
used as abbreviations henceforth.   
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Scholarship on 1960’s history and unrest focuses on the transformation from the Civil Rights 
Movement to the more radical movements later in the decade. Scholars largely agree that Civil Rights 
catalyzed the formation of student groups and New Leftist ideologies, the former acting as the prime 
facilitator for activist efforts and the latter acting as the source of inspiration.2 By the mid-1960’s, social 
divisions and disillusionment with society became increasingly prevalent as U.S. leaders were unable to 
meet the rising expectations of the nation that, in conjunction with military escalation in Vietnam, urban 
rioting, and new radical student group leaders, reached a climax in 1968.3 Some historians attribute the 
election of Richard Nixon to the presidency in 1972 to the stamping out of social unrest of “the long 
sixties,”  but others argue that the splintering movements regarding Red Power, Chicano/Chicana rights, 
feminism, environmentalism, and gay liberation signify activist successes that continued well into the 
1970’s and even the 1980’s.4 Though recognizing the influence of Christian theology in New Leftist 
politics and the different political trends of mainline Protestants and Catholics, this discussion often 
excludes Christian institutions in the historical narrative on 1960’s social unrest.5 Rather, it highlights a 
few religious figures who were active in anti-war protesting and the Civil Rights Movement. 
Furthermore, this historical discussion recognizes social activism at the expense of declining authority, 
but does not connect the persistence of later activism (e.g. women’s liberation) to weakened state of 
institutional authority from the 1960’s. 
When the history of mainline Protestantism and Catholicism in the 1960’s is addressed by 
historians, the emphasis is put on activist theology and the Second Vatican Council. Their general 
                                                          
2 For more on social movements see Terry H. Anderson, The Movement and The Sixties: From Greensboro to Wounded Knee 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), and for an international perspective see Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global 
Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003).  
3 For a broad overview of 1960’s history see Maurice Isserman and Michael Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s. 
5th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) and Mark Hamilton Lytle, America’s Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to 
the Fall of Richard Nixon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
4 For case studies on 1960’s movements see Van Gosse and Moser Richard, eds. The World the 1960s Made: Politics and Culture 
in Recent America (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003) and David Burner, Making Peace with the 60s (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1996). 
5 For more on the Christian New Left see Doug Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity, and the New Left 
in America, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998). 
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agreement for mainline Protestantism is that its emphasis on Social Gospel and its history of being part 
of American mainstream culture have enabled Protestant clergymen to engage in activist efforts at the 
national level.6 On the other hand, Catholics limited their “good works” to neighborhoods until Vatican II 
in 1965, which sanctioned cleric and lay participation in the national movements of the time.7 However, 
this activism of mainline and Catholic clergy did more harm than good when considering Civil Rights and 
lay dissatisfaction. Mainline Protestants were involved with the Civil Rights Movement and played an 
integral part in the Freedom Summer of 1964, but failed to integrate their own churches and withdrew 
their support by the end of the decade.8 Catholics had more success with the black community because 
they labeled minority rights activism as fulfilling their duty of good works. Vatican II complicated 
Catholic activism by politicizing racial and religious concerns, which brought white/black and Catholic 
liberal/conservative tensions to the forefront. Participating in the movements of the 1960’s was 
controversial for mainline and Catholic clergy and created distancing between the Church and the laity. 
Mainline parishioners disapproved of their clergy’s political involvement and Catholics were turned off 
by the papal stances on birth control and abortion.9 Even though these historians acknowledge the 
social activism of mainline Protestants and Catholics, they do not explore their differing responses in 
relation to their perceived role of religious authority.  
Therefore, this thesis addresses several gaps in historiography by localizing the authority crisis of 
the 1960’s. It investigates the responses to social unrest of mainline Protestant and Catholic 
                                                          
6 For case studies on mainline Protestant activism see Robert Wuthnow and John H. Evans, eds. The Quiet Hand of God: Faith-
Based Activism and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: Regents of the University of 
California, 2002). 
7 For more on Vatican II see Philip Gleason, “Catholicism and Cultural Changes in the 1960’s.” The Review of Politics, America in 
Change: Reflections on the 60’s and 70's, vol. 34, no. 4 (October 1972) and Dean R. Hoge, “Interpreting Change in American 
Catholicism: The River and the Floodgate.” Review of Religious Research vol. 50 (October 2008). 
8 For Protestant activism in the Civil Rights Movement see James F. Findlay Jr., Church People in the Struggle: The National 
Council of Churches and the Black Freedom Movement, 1950-1970, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
9 For more on Catholic clergy activism and lay disapproval see Kristen E. Heyer, Mark J. Rozell, and Michael A. Genovese eds., 
The Dynamic Tension between Faith and Power, (Washington, DC: George Washington Press, 2008) and for Catholic activism in 
in civil rights see John T. McGreevy, Parish Boundaries: The Catholics Encounter with Race in the Twentieth-Century Urban North 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
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organizations from 1960 to 1973 at the local level of Albany, New York. It defines the mainline 
Protestant and Catholic interpretations of the political and social situation of the time and makes 
distinctions in their understanding of certain issues in relation to their churchly authority. By contrasting 
two Christian institutions, the Capital Area Council of Churches (CACC) and the Roman Catholic Diocese 
of Albany, this thesis demonstrates how different Christian denominations failed to maintain authority 
in the face of unrest (represented by students at the State University of New York at Albany, or SUNY 
Albany).10 Most importantly, it demonstrates how authority loss during the 1960’s was very likely. 
Mainline Protestants in the CACC reacted to authority threats by getting involved while Catholics in the 
Albany Catholic Diocese reacted through a policy of avoidance. In the end, both failed to maintain 
authority. Historians have contextualized this authority loss in one of two ways. Either unrest was 
stamped out by the election of President Nixon or activism persisted well into the 70’s or 80’s. I use the 
latter framework, but rather than focus on how activism persisted, I highlight how institutional authority 
weakened, allowing said activism to persist. This idea is crucial to understanding the larger narrative on 
the era and current history since it shows how the tumultuous sixties were defined by the Baby Boom 
cohort, who are very much alive today.  
More specifically, I argue that mainline Protestant and Catholic clergy in the Albany area had 
different interpretations of and approaches to 1960’s unrest. The Capital Area Council of Churches 
manifested its authority within American mainstream culture. In order to maintain authority, it had to 
maintain the relevancy of said authority. Changes in social problems and their threats to religious 
authority were therefore solved by active involvement. The CACC used campus ministry at SUNY Albany 
to relate its Church authority to campus unrest. In the early 1960’s, it had little trouble with its hands-on 
approach, but as student culture and protesting radicalized, CACC ministry fell apart. CACC members 
                                                          
10 Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany is shortened to Diocese, Albany Diocese, and Albany Catholic Diocese throughout this 
paper. 
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applied a similar approach to black civil rights. They were active in the Civil Rights Movement, but 
struggled to maintain white authority in the face of increased cries for black leadership in the late 
1960’s. On the other hand, the Albany Catholic Diocese had a hands-off approach to activism. It 
delegated campus ministry duties at SUNY Albany to the Newman Club, and Newman members dealt 
with the brunt of student unrest. The separation hurt the Diocese since Catholics were venturing outside 
the Catholic parochial system and the Diocese was unable to relate its authority to its changing 
believers. In regard to black civil rights, the Albany Diocese continued its hands-off approach, with the 
exception of Bishop Reverend Maginn’s Diocesan Development Fund. In this case, authority was lost 
among Catholic liberals (for inaction until 1968) and Catholic conservatives (for the Diocesan Fund). In 
any event, the Church could not hold on to local authority, despite the opposing strategies between the 
Catholics and the mainline Protestants. In a last attempt to save religious authority, the CACC inducted 
the Albany Catholic Diocese as a member in 1973.  
My argument is presented in four sections, the first being a chapter introducing SUNY Albany 
from 1960 to 1970. Though recognizing and tying in the national narrative, it focuses on what was 
happening specifically in Albany regarding student protestors and campus unrest related to 1960’s 
movements. The second chapter analyzes the Capital Area Council of Churches and the Albany Catholic 
Diocese chronologically, starting in 1960 and ending in 1973, and thematically with campus ministry. The 
purpose of this section is to contrast the CACC and the Albany Diocese in how they defined these issues 
and had different religious approaches. The third chapter analyzes black civil rights in the same format 
to highlight another area of contrast between the two institutions. Both sections reveal a loss of 
institutional authority from both the CACC and Albany Diocese. The last chapter is an epilogue about the 
CACC and the Albany Catholic Diocese coming together in 1973. 
  
The Road to the 70’s: SUNY Albany   
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Albany, New York did not avoid the effects of the transformative 1960’s, and realized this with 
expansion of the State University of New York at Albany in 1962. Previously located in the downtown 
area, the University moved to a bigger campus to accommodate increasing student enrollments. 
Together, the Baby Boom and the G.I. Bill more than doubled college enrollments since 1940 and 
enabled 44 percent of young Americans to attend college by 1965.11 SUNY Albany indicated a similar 
demographic transition with the building of its new campus to which students brought the national 
issues and movements of the 1960’s. Similar to the larger narrative, social unrest at SUNY first 
manifested in Civil Rights activism and expressions against in loco parentis, and later in the anti-Vietnam 
War and Student Power movements. By 1970, student protesting at SUNY Albany significantly 
diminished the institutional authority of university administrators. The scattered anti-Vietnam War 
demonstrations at SUNY and the Free Speech Movement at University of California, Berkeley both 
threatened and broke down the power of authority institutions, even if just the latter the made the 
national stage. For this reason, the story of SUNY Albany made an important contribution reflecting the 
larger historical narrative: The decline of conventional authority was not just a national phenomenon, it 
happened locally, as well.  
Although university administrators at SUNY Albany did not face pervasive campus unrest in the 
early 1960’s, they did face threats from the catalyst – the Civil Rights Movement. At first glance, student 
activism related to the Movement appeared benign to Northern universities. Civil Rights activists used 
non-violent protests and sit-ins to target legal segregation in the South and push for Civil Rights 
legislation, which challenged institutions still using Jim Crow as an authority system.12 However, student 
groups founded during the Movement challenged even the “innocent” SUNY Albany administrators. In 
                                                          
11 Chafe, William H. The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II. Seventh ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
106-7 and 307-8. 
12 Chafe, The Unfinished Journey. 142- 7 
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April 1960, young activists at Shaw University broke apart from other Civil Rights groups, like the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and formed the separate Student Non- Violent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC). Henceforth, students, including SUNY students, began controlling their 
activism through their own independent groups.13 In the early 1960’s, church ministers led Civil Rights 
activism at the University by hosting on-campus discussions, but soon lost that power to direct and 
control the conversation to student groups. By 1965, SUNY Albany’s division of SNCC and the SCLC gave 
speeches while another student group, Summer Community Organization and Political Education group 
(SCOPE), held a voting rights rally.14 Even though the students belonging to these groups were a 
minority, they still threatened local authority by directing their Civil Rights activism independently and 
apart from authority figures.   
In addition to the growth of student groups, the Free Speech Movement challenged SUNY 
Albany’s institutional authority. Officially beginning in 1964 at the University of California, Berkeley, the 
Free Speech Movement questioned universities’ power over students and criticized their overregulation 
of activities under in loco parentis.15 The policy granted college administrators the legal right to enforce 
strict rules on curfews, drinking, and co-ed visitation in dorms to fulfill the missing parental role.16 With 
this authority, the Berkeley administration had restricted political activities on campus, and students 
retaliated with mass defiance.17 The Free Speech Movement shook the nation by showing students 
would go so far as to protest against the rules in order to vocalize their point to administrators. A similar 
                                                          
13 Anderson, Terry H. The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995. 49- 51. 
14 “Minister to Discuss Civil Rights Position,” Albany Student Press. 30 October 1964. Student Newspaper Collection, Series 6: 
1964, Volume 50, Number 27, Grenander Archives (ASP and Student Paper will be used as abbreviations henceforth); “Director 
Discusses Negro Conditions,” ASP. 12 February 1965. Student Paper, Series 6: 1965, Volume 51, Number 1, Grenander Archives; 
“SNCC Member Gives Speech; Braces Civil Rights History,” ASP. 6 April 1965. Student Paper, Series 6: 1965, Volume 51, Number 
11; “Civil Rights Leader to Speak in Page, Role of SNCC,” ASP. 2 April 1965. Student Paper, Series 6: 1965, Volume 51, Number 
10, Grenander Archives. “SCOPE to Sponsor Voter Rights Rally Sunday Afternoon,” ASP. 9 April 1965, Student Paper, Series 50: 
1965, Volume 51, Number 12, Grenander Archives. 
15 Lytle, Mark Hamilton. America’s Uncivil Wars: The Sixties Era from Elvis to the Fall of Richard Nixon. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006. 168- 73. 
16 Anderson. The Movement and the Sixties. 97- 101.  
17 Lytle, America’s Uncivil Wars. 170- 1.  
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realization took place at SUNY Albany. In 1965, the Association of Women Students challenged in loco 
parentis by proposing later curfew hours and more freedom overall.18 As with Berkeley students, it 
argued against the right of university administrators to impose arbitrary rules. Some students were less 
formal when expressing their discontent, and what was described as a “PDA” (public display of affection) 
epidemic broke out in student lounges and dorms. It got to the point where SUNY Albany’s president, 
President Evan Collins, arranged and participated in a panel discussing in loco parentis, his powers under 
the policy, and what it should mean to the University community.19 Given the anxious reaction of 
university administrators, SUNY students definitely represented an obvious threat. If in loco parentis 
could not protect the University’s authority, then little else would.  
By the mid 1960’s, student activism shifted from the Civil Rights Movement to the Vietnam War, 
presenting more challenges to institutional authority. An important force behind the activist changes 
was the campus group Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). In 1962, SDS at University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, drafted The Port Huron Statement and created the spirit of the New Left. The manifesto was 
against war, nuclear weapons, and Jim Crow segregation, but more importantly, it called for a 
“participatory democracy.” New Left beliefs galvanized college students to question authority and take 
action, as seen with Berkeley students and the Free Speech Movement. More importantly, the group 
itself promoted confrontational activist methods for anti-Vietnam protesting in the late 1960’s, and the 
new militancy significantly threatened institutional authority nationally and locally. For this reason, SDS 
and the Port Huron Statement were key developments in the 1960’s that influenced campus unrest and 
the breakdown of university control.20 Even the SUNY Albany Administration could not avoid the effects 
of the Ann Arbor revolutionaries:  In 1965, students created the University’s own SDS chapter.21 The 
                                                          
18 “Make Haste Slowly,” ASP. 25 February 1965. Student Paper, Series 6: 1965, Volume 51, Number 4, Grenander Archives. 
19 “Student, Professor Call PDA Rule Farce, Propose Reform in Dorm,” ASP. 12 March 1965. Student Paper, Series 6: 1965, 
Volume 51, Number 7, Grenander Archives. “Collins-Panel Dialogue to Deal with Campus,” ASP. 12 March 1965. Student Paper, 
Series 6: 1965, Volume 51, Number 7, Grenander Archives. 
20 Isserman and Kazin, America Divided. 166- 70.  
21 Anderson, The Movement and the Sixties. 61- 67. 
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formation of SDS indicated the growth of Student Power to SUNY administrators, a reality further 
underscored by activism against the Vietnam War. 
Anti-Vietnam War activism followed the same pattern of Civil Rights activism on SUNY Albany’s 
campus: First controlled by authority figures and later taken over by student activist groups. Before 
1967, students mostly acted as participants in anti-war activities. They attended debates about the 
Vietnam War hosted by Forum of Politics, a student-faculty panel, and listened to Senator Wayne 
Morse, a politician known for his “vehement opposition to American actions” in the war.22 The student 
activism temporarily deferential to the Administration’s leadership would quickly break apart as it 
radicalized. In June 1967, President Lyndon Johnson issued an executive order putting nineteen-year-old 
men at the top of the draft. As a result, anti-draft demonstrations heightened throughout the country 
while protestors, influenced by SDS, used confrontational tactics.23 During Stop the Draft Week and the 
March on the Pentagon, some draft resisters charged police lines and law enforcement rather than 
persist with non-violent protests.24 The militancy significantly challenged federal authority and, back in 
Albany, students posed the same threats. They showed solidarity for the nationwide protest of Stop the 
Draft Week by burning their own draft cards and joined the March on the Pentagon. 25 Despite their 
small number, SUNY students engaging in the radical activism threatened institutional authority. In 
response, administrators would try to lead anti-war efforts to get in front of the students.  
SUNY Albany Administration attempted to control draft resistance on campus, but failed in their 
endeavors. Since the draft had become a source of upset for college students, faculty members created 
the Teachers’ Draft Counseling Committee in 1967. The University did not possess the resources to 
                                                          
22 “Morse to Discuss Vietnam Sunday, Tickets Sold out for Lecture,” ASP. 20 May 1966. Student Paper, Series 6: 1966, Volume 
52, Number 21, Grenander Archives; “Students, Faculty Discuss Vietnam during Forum of Politics Meeting,” ASP. 20 May 1966. 
Student Paper, Series 6: 1966, Volume 52, Number 21, Grenander Archives. 
23 Isserman and Kazin, America Divided. 178- 83. 
24 Lytle, America’s Uncivil War. 217, 240- 2. 
25 “Pentagon Under Siege, Oct. 21, 22, 1967,” ASP. 26 October 1967. Student Paper, Series 6: 1967, Volume 54, Number 5, 
Grenander Archives.  
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educate students on the draft and did not want to cause any reason for protest, so faculty formed the 
Teachers’ Draft Counseling Committee to fill in the gap.26 President Collins gave the Committee his seal 
of approval as well as to a mass teach-in on campus. The teach-in hosted thirty speakers from 
institutions such as Princeton, Tufts, and Harvard, who spoke on the Vietnam War – of course Collins 
supported it. The activism was directed by university authority figures while quelling unrest.27 Yet, as 
seen with other areas of student discontent, this control was short lived. In 1968, Students for a 
Democratic Society formed its own draft council, the Anti-Draft Committee of the Students for 
Democratic Society. Although it did not directly replace the Teachers’ Committee, SDS’s version 
provided the same counsel and offered training for students to work alongside the teachers’ auxiliary.28 
In other words, through SDS, students trained themselves and other students to take over faculty-led 
draft counseling. They also took over on-campus activism. SDS and the Committee to End the War held 
an Anti-War Week that entailed a GI rally, poetry reading, and open dialogues. The activist groups 
wanted to not only inform students but also give them opportunities to express discontent.29 Therefore, 
all students, not just those in SDS, exercised discretion in their anti-Vietnam War efforts, marking 
another moment of lost authority for SUNY Albany Administration.  
The year 1968 saw significant social upheaval that challenged national authority and 
transformed student activism into Student Power. The Tet Offensive, for exposing the horrors of the 
Vietnam War, and the assassination of two political leaders, Dr. Martin Luther King Junior and Robert F. 
Kennedy, took away idealists’ hope and gave New Leftists and student activists little reason to trust 
                                                          
26 “Assemblyman Kelleher Attacks Draft Counseling Group,” ASP. 9 February 1968. Student Paper, Series 6: 1968, Volume 54, 
Number 13. Grenander Archives. 
27 “Pres. Collins Discusses Drugs; Draft Counseling,” ASP. 9 February 1968. Student Paper, Series 6: 1968, Volume 54, Number 
13, Grenander Archives. “Over 800 Reached at Teach-In Genocide, Draft Discussed,” ASP. 3 May 1968. Student Paper, Series 6: 
1968, Volume 54, Number 21, Grenander Archives; “Collins Lauds Teach-In, Makes War Comments,” ASP. 3 May 1968. Student 
Paper, Series 6: 1968, Volume 54, Number 21, Grenander Archives. 
28 “SDS Forms Draft Council,” ASP. 11 October 1968. Student Paper, Series 6: 1968, Volume 55, Number 5, Grenander Archives.   
29 “War Protest Week Examines Vietnam,” ASP. 18 October 1968. Student Paper, Series 6: 1968, Volume 55, Number 7, 
Grenander Archives.  
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authority.30 In fact, during a demonstration against Columbia University, student protestors barricaded 
several campus buildings against its expansion into Harlem. Their actions were important because they 
represented students exercising power over university property and over Columbia Administration. The 
Columbia protest drove FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to target SDS and other radical groups with 
counterintelligence programs, while Yippies exacerbated government paranoia. Yippies, radical activists 
who promoted anarchy, counterculture, and anything against mainstream politics, gathered by the 
thousands in Chicago to disrupt the Democratic Convention. Similar to Hoover, Chicago Mayor Richard 
Daley responded very seriously and with a law enforcement team of 12,000 police, 6,000 National 
Guardsmen, and 7,500 Army troops.31 In essence, whether it were student protestors at Columbia 
University or Yippies in Chicago, young activists had started threatening authority institutions less with 
their activism and more with their desire for increased control and violent physical action.  
Likewise, SUNY Albany students demanded more power that challenged institutional authority 
beyond the University. In 1969, the New York State government proposed budget cuts across the SUNY 
system, meaning raises in tuition for students. Unsurprisingly, the news was not taken well, and the 
students decided to take action against the decision. The Confederated Student Government, the 
student representative body of all state universities of New York, called for a “one week strike of classes 
on all SUNY campuses accompanied by a mass rally in Albany.”32 Between 13,000 and 15,000 SUNY 
students, 3,000 of which belonging to Albany, marched at the Capitol protesting the budget proposals. 
Several even met personally with Governor Nelson Rockefeller and state legislators.33 While university 
                                                          
30 I differentiate between student activists and New Leftists because they were not always in the same group. Many New 
Leftists, for example, did not support the confrontational tactics in anti-Vietnam War protesting while SDSers did. SDS 
blueprinted the New Left ideology but the two were not synonymous.  
31 Isserman and Kazin, America Divided. 219- 32. 
32 “CSG Calls for SUNY Strike,” ASP. 25 February 1969. Student Paper, Series 6: 1969, Volume 55, Number 29, Grenander 
Archives.  
33 “SUNY March Will Go On,” ASP. 21 March 1969. Student Paper, Series 6: Volume 55, Number 36, Grenander Archives; 
“Students Meet Rocky in Save SUNY Effort,” ASP. 21 March 1969. Student Paper, Series 6: Volume 55, Number 36, Grenander 
Archives. 
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administrators supported the “Save SUNY” efforts (budget cuts meant bad news for them too), they felt 
threatened by the idea that thousands of SUNY students collectively organized against the state 
government. They realized students had considerable power and threatened all areas of institutional 
authority, from higher education to the government, from the national level to the local level.  
By 1970, SUNY Albany Administration lost its institutional authority to the students, beginning 
with the dismissal of a professor. Acting University President Allan A. Kuusisto debated on renewing 
Gerald Wagner’s professorship in the Department of Rhetoric and Public Address. Before even making a 
decision, the Acting President had 200 students participating in a sit-in outside his office, protesting 
against Wagner’s dismissal. They presented Kuusisto with two requisites stating they would stay put 
until a decision was made regarding Wagner’s reappointment and, more importantly, for "complete 
faculty-student control of all aspects of University life."34 In other words, SUNY students during the early 
1960’s wanted to direct their activism. Now they wanted control over local politics and the University 
Administration. Kuusisto realized this desire for control when he decided to dismiss Wagner and 
subsequently had windows broken by angry students in the Administration Building. Unfortunately this 
was just the start.35 They stole artwork from buildings and dorms and conflated their cries for Student 
Power with their activist efforts. An 800-900 person meeting of campus groups, such as Women’s 
Liberation and the Black Panther Party, spontaneously wreaked havoc on the library when books were 
tossed the facility.36 Similarly, a joint Black Power and anti-war demonstration in downtown Albany 
turned serious when the 3,000 protestors ended up closing the State Capitol.37 In these instances, SUNY 
                                                          
34 “No Decision Yet,” ASP. 13 March 1970. Student Paper, Series 7: 1970- 1979, Volume 57, Number 9, Grenander Archives.  
35 “Senate Endorses Dialogue; No Classes Thursday, Friday,” ASP. 17 March 1970. Student Paper, Series 7: 1970- 1979, Volume 
57, Number 10, Grenander Archives.   
36 “Stolen Art on Campus,” ASP. 28 April 1970. Student Paper, Series 7: 1970- 1979, Volume 57, Number 19, Grenander 
Archives; “Campus Factions Outline Strike Guidelines, Rationale,” ASP. 1 May 1970. Student Paper, Series 7: 1970- 1979, 
Volume 57, Number 17, Grenander Archives. 
37 “3000 Demonstrators March on Downtown,” ASP. 7 May 1970. Student Paper, Series 7: 1970- 1979, Volume 57, Number 18, 
Grenander Archives; “Federal Building Closed,” ASP. 13 May 1970. Student Paper, Series 7: 1970- 1979, Volume 57, Number 18, 
Grenander Archives. 
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students demonstrated that they were not activists solely for a social cause. They were activists for 
Student Power too, and throwing books and storming the Capitol were acts to show their independence 
from authority institutions. The acts also signaled the University Administration’s inability to maintain 
institutional authority on campus.  
The story of SUNY Albany proved that the authority crisis of the 1960’s was seen at the local 
level. Beginning with Civil Rights activism and ending with Student Power, campus unrest at SUNY 
Albany threatened the conventional authority of university administrators and government officials. 
Authority loss was not isolated to the national level. The few SUNY students attending the voting rights’ 
rally in 1965 and those who participated in the Columbia University protest both challenged 
conventional authority. Student activism had come to represent and embody a fight for increased power 
over authority institutions and, by 1970, institutional authority suffered nationally while locally it could 
not be maintained. Authority at all levels experienced immense pressure from Baby Boomers during the 
1960’s. 
 
  
On Campus Activism: CACC and Albany Catholic Diocese  
 
Similar to administrators at SUNY Albany, mainline Protestants in the Capital Area Council of 
Churches grappled with the authority changes caused by 1960’s social unrest. They established an active 
campus ministry program at the University through which they sought to modulate threats from student 
protesting. To members there was no difference between the more radical campuses of Berkeley and 
University Michigan, Ann Arbor, and the campus at SUNY Albany, and they used the national stage to 
inform ministry. Campus ministry thus went to great lengths relating the Church to issues surrounding 
morality, the draft, and the Vietnam War in response to the changes challenging authority. Over time, 
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the two CACC ministers, Reverend Frank Snow and Reverend William Small, became extremely divided 
over the right approach to student issues as protesting radicalized. Even mainline Protestantism’s 
history with activism and social reform did not prepare the ministers for the 1960’s: By 1970 the damage 
was done at Albany. It was clear the power of the Church meant little to much of America’s youth and 
the other instigators of cultural upheaval.38  
The Capital Area Council of Churches (CACC) is a local branch of the larger National Council of 
Churches and World Council of Churches. The local ecumenical organization was founded in 1941 and 
consists of approximately ninety faith communities in the Albany area, most of which are mainline 
Protestant.39 Mainline Protestantism consists of multiple Protestant denominations that have similar, 
but not the same, belief systems. These denominations tend to reflect liberal political ideology, 
emphasize using the Church to instill social reform, and were part of American mainstream culture. 
Mainline Protestantism vests authority in its relevancy to the larger society and adapts to social changes 
in order to stay relevant, hence its long history of social justice and public role in the United States. For 
instance, the rapid industrialization of the nineteenth century instigated the Social Gospel Movement, 
when mainline Protestants used the Church to support trust-busting and anti-child labor causes. In the 
1960’s, the CACC was no different and closely linked its institutional authority to the national stage.40 In 
doing so, and by getting so involved, it lost significant authority amongst the upheaval of the decade, 
especially in regard to campus unrest.  
In the beginning, the Capital Area Council of Churches had control over campus ministry at SUNY 
Albany. As one might expect, it first wanted a campus ministry with religiously-based objectives, 
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meaning a desire to bridge the Church and the University through programs rooted in Christian 
theology. In the early 1960’s this approach made sense. While there were instances of Civil Rights 
activism on campuses and the creation of student activist groups, student protesting was not yet 
widespread or labeled a national threat.41 To mainline Protestants, the challenge was religious diversity. 
The GI Bill combined with the coming of age of Baby Boomers guaranteed increased enrollments and 
naturally, increased enrollments of non-Protestant students. The election of John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, 
to the U.S. presidency in 1960 also indicated a less Protestant world to the Capital Area Council of 
Churches. Therefore, in 1963 Reverend Frank Snow announced a new plan for campus ministry 
addressing the religious diversity and larger student population expected at SUNY. He proposed 
ecumenical Sunday services to attract Jewish and Catholic students even though it “pose[d] both 
theological and practical problems of great complexity…and [would] require both vision and a 
willingness to experiment.”42 To match the larger number of students, the CACC purchased property 
adjacent to SUNY’s new campus for ministry operations and hired Reverend William Small to assist 
Snow.43 These religious and demographic challenges seemed small compared to what the late 1960’s 
eventually brought, but they threatened the Protestant hegemony and the CACC needed to adapt to 
keep its religious authority intact and relatable to American culture.  
 By the mid 1960’s, the Capital Area Council of Churches realized that students posed more 
threats with their Free Speech rather than their religious diversity. The Free Speech Movement broke 
out on campuses and although protesting still remained sporadic, the questions raised challenged ideas 
surrounding authority systems. Henceforth, appealing to students would be more daunting for the 
CACC. To remain relevant, campus ministry needed programs beyond religiously-based objectives that 
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addressed student concerns outside the Church. The ecumenical program ran by Snow only attracted a 
modest following among students, so in 1964 he created “Golden Eye.” Golden Eye entailed weekly 
discussions and activities moderated by Snow and Small at the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church for 
SUNY students and faculty.44 It purposely covered controversial topics that interested students and 
recognized the cultural changes taking place on campuses.45 For example, the talk “The Absurd 
University” explored the Free Speech Movement and debated if the university system resembled a 
factory more than an institution of intellectual growth.46 The panelists sympathized with the student 
argument and agreed that higher education needed to be recognized as a place for intrinsic 
development not as a means to an end.47 Clearly, Rev. Snow was using this talk to relate to students at 
SUNY Albany, and even admitted that Golden Eye was a “somewhat less conventional undertaking.”48 
The Capital Area Council of Churches hoped that by supplementing religious ministry programs with 
Golden Eye, it would develop a rapport with the student community and prevent its loss of authority.  
 In a final attempt to keep a religiously-oriented ministry in the face of rising campus unrest, the 
Capital Area Council of Churches sought to bolster its institutional presence at SUNY Albany with a multi-
denominational campus ministry. By 1966, Snow’s ecumenical services instigated the creation of the 
Albany Collegiate Interfaith Corporation, an organization with representatives from the CACC, the 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, and Albany Jewish Community Council. Once realizing that SUNY 
Albany was “a major university in our midst,” Snow and others created the Corporation to raise money 
and eventually build a bigger Interfaith Center closer to campus. In the early 1960’s, when students 
posed threats with their numbers and religious diversity, the CACC enjoyed its monopoly over SUNY 
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Albany ministry. Now it wanted other faiths to share duties and help maintain some type of theological 
presence at the University as students increasingly challenged authority institutions with protesting or 
activist groups related to free speech and in loco parentis. Snow proposed a similar idea on a smaller 
level – merging ministry programs with the Newman Club, a Catholic student club headed by Catholic 
chaplain priests.49 The Capital Area Council of Churches wanted the Albany Collegiate Interfaith 
Corporation and other religious leaders to protect its local authority by enhancing its theological 
underpinnings at SUNY Albany. The project never went through, though, so the campus ministers opted 
for a more radical route they believed would effectively maintain Church power at the University. 
 Because Reverend Snow and Reverend Small worked directly with college students, they aimed 
to protect Church authority from campus unrest by getting involved and using pastoral care to focus on 
student issues. By 1967, anti-Vietnam War demonstrations, draft card protests, and counterculture 
became prominent on the national stage. Christian clergy were divided over the appropriate response to 
related activism, with some saying it was too violent and others joining in and burning draft cards.50 
Snow and Small decided to go with the latter approach and immediately changed their mission to 
address “genuinely significant issues,” which they defined as the Vietnam War and university reform.51 
They counseled SUNY students over the draft and created educational programs for clergy and teachers 
in classes entitled “The Public School and Black Power.”52 In doing so, Snow and Small informed local 
authority figures about the national agenda of student activists and how to remain relevant to its 
objectives. They additionally refrained from prophesizing issues to depict the Church as an ally to the 
students and as an institution that supported them through pastoral counseling and classes about their 
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concerns.53 Snow and Small believed that immersing campus ministry into university life would 
underscore the Capital Area Council of Churches’ relevancy and authority in Albany. They were wrong. 
 In 1968, profound cultural and political upheaval swept the nation that marked the breakdown 
of national authority. To avoid a similar fate, Reverend Snow and Reverend Small concluded that 
campus ministry in Albany must take a new direction to meet radical student culture, even if it meant 
addressing sexuality.54 Small decided to get involved with dorm series covering topics such as “New 
Morality” and “Contemporary Sexuality.” The Golden Eye discussions over politics and philosophy were 
no match for the difficulty of his new task, relating the Church to the sexual revolution. Struggling with 
the balancing act, Small called the world of the student “a happening-place, unfolding and exploding… in 
perplexing, even frightening dimensions.”55 Snow empathized. After working with individuals from the 
“activist camp” and the Teacher’s Draft Counseling Committee, he concluded that students moved 
beyond simple questioning of the Vietnam War and were taking action through draft resistance.56 He 
proposed creating an Institute for Religion and Ethics to “raise within the University a wide range of 
theological questions and concerns now all too often obscured or ignored.”57 Just two years ago, Snow 
wanted to educate clergy and teachers on student needs, but he started to realize this approach was 
turning campus ministry into an institution that facilitated students’ rebellious behavior rather than one 
that prevented it.  
The radical campus ministry of Reverend Snow and Reverend Small purposed with maintaining 
local authority backfired once unrest climaxed at SUNY Albany in 1970. The Capital Area Council of 
Churches relied on the two ministers to modulate student protesting and activism yet “well-publicized, 
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recent incidents of vandalism and firebombing” still took place at the University.58 Given the increased 
radicalization of students, Snow and Small began having major disagreements over the ministry’s next 
strategy. The latter minister favored their previous policy of appeasement towards students, arguing 
that institutions fueled their frustrations and religious responses to issues were a waste of time. Small 
thus called for a focus on pastoral counseling, ecumenical worship services, and dialogues on drugs, 
human sexuality, and politics. While he admitted campus ministry responded feebly at times, he saw its 
declining influence as a chance to “calculate more effective approaches to a University community.”59 To 
put simply, Small still believed that being involved with student culture and connecting the Church to 
the University would preserve the CACC’s authority in Albany. Snow had completely different 
interpretation. The events on campus pushed him to spend six months in India for some peace, where 
he came to the conclusion that the CACC, or any ministry for that matter, was ill-equipped for the 
“emergencies of fundamental nature” presented by SUNY students.60 Unlike Small, Snow couldn’t see 
religious institutions sustaining authority at the University and blamed the “fragmented, localized 
ministries, [both] Catholic and Protestant, in Albany New York,” for what happened.61 To him, theology 
was the answer, but he was discouraged that the Albany Collegiate Interfaith Corporation made no 
progress in building a religious center. In sum, the two ministers had contrasting solutions to campus 
ministry. Small called for a ministry that sided with the students while Snow called for a ministry 
strongly rooted in religion. Both sought to protect authority at the University, including their own, but 
by different means. 
In the early 1970’s, it became clear that the Capital Area Council of Churches was unable to 
maintain authority at SUNY Albany through campus ministry. In 1971, the organization terminated 
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Reverend Small because of a “variety of problems [that] had developed” between the CACC and the 
Episcopal Diocese, the institution which originally installed the minister. With Small gone, Reverend 
Snow had to deal with the effects of the program they created together. He was stuck addressing 
student issues no matter how religiously threatening or immoral because he and Small had become 
secularized, admitting that “campus ministry has been part of at least some of this, explicitly or 
otherwise.”62 By reaching out to students so aggressively, the ministers downgraded from religious 
leaders to campus counselors. This rude awakening prompted Snow to relocate to Rochester, New York, 
and he did not return for the 1972- 1973 academic year. Down two reverends, the CACC needed 
another faith organization to take over and sold the ministry building at SUNY Albany (Chapel House) to 
the Albany Collegiate Interfaith Corporation. Religious leaders from the CACC, the Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Albany, Jewish communities, and the Episcopal Diocese now controlled and split duties.63 
Ironically, after supporting a ministry aimed only at student culture, the CACC decided to turn attention 
back to religion, broke and defeated. 
In sum, the Capital Area Council of Churches had a hands-on approach to campus threats at 
SUNY Albany and relied on campus ministry to maintain local power and modulate student opinions. In 
the early 1960’s, campus ministry focused on religious diversity and increased enrollments since student 
protesting had not become a widespread problem. Rather, demographic changes in college-goers 
sparked concern for the CACC, whose members had to accept a less Protestant campus. By the mid 
1960’s, student discontent started reaching national prominence and campus ministry had to 
incorporate non-religious programs to reach out to students more effectively. The rise of anti-Vietnam 
War protesting, draft card burning, and counterculture required Reverend Snow and Reverend Small to 
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fully detached from religion and become solely invested in student concerns. Their ministry imploded as 
a result. They facilitated unrest by unconditionally supporting student activism and culture regardless of 
how radical they had become. The CACC intended campus ministry to be an institution that reduced 
social upheaval, but its strategy failed when SUNY students instigated violent protests in 1970. This 
failure led to Small’s termination, Snow’s quitting, and the surrender of campus ministry to the Albany 
Collegiate Interfaith Corporation. The Capital Area Council of Churches did not sustain local authority in 
Albany through a socially conscience campus ministry in touch with the national discussion. 
As with mainline Protestants in the Capital Area Council of Churches, Catholics in the Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Albany were threatened by campus unrest at SUNY Albany. However, they took the 
opposite approach to protect their institutional authority in face of such threats. When Reverend Frank 
Snow adapted the CACC to religious diversity with interfaith services, the Albany Catholic Diocese 
condemned Catholic students for attending secular universities and stepped back, allowing the Newman 
Club to take the place of Catholic ministry at SUNY Albany. When Snow and Small responded to anti-war 
protesting with draft counseling and to radical student culture with discussions on free speech and 
sexuality, the Albany Catholic Diocese remained out of touch with these changes, despite Vatican II 
calling on Catholic clergy to be activists outside the Church. By 1970, the Diocese realized that by staying 
isolated from campus life, the legitimacy of its institutional power diminished and could not be 
effectively conveyed to Catholic students. The Albany Catholic Diocese failed to maintain authority in 
Albany, by appearances, for failing to get involved with the issues raised by campus unrest. It was this 
failure and subsequent loss of authority that drove the Diocese to join the CACC in 1973.  
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany (RCDA) was founded in 1847 and represents the Catholic 
churches in the Capital Region. Catholicism as a religion and as an institution distributes power via rigid 
hierarchy, with the pope at the top holding the most religious jurisdiction, followed by cardinals, 
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bishops, priests, and Catholic laity at the bottom.64 The most important event contextualizing 
Catholicism during the 1960’s was Second Vatican Council (1962- 1965). The pope convened the Second 
Vatican Council, or Vatican II, to modernize Catholic doctrine by making the Catholic Church a “Church of 
the People” and emphasizing ecumenism between Catholics and other Christian sects. Up until this 
point, Catholicism was an immigrant Church separated from the larger society. Most parish communities 
were located in cities and attracted large followings from the Irish and Italians, whose children were 
educated in Catholic parochial schools. After World War II, Catholic Americans experienced enough 
social mobility to enter the American mainstream, which was confirmed with the election of the first 
Catholic president, John F. Kennedy, in 1960.65 The papacy responded with Vatican II doctrinal changes, 
the two most significant being Gaudium et Spes, or the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World, and Unitatis Redintegratio, the Decree on Ecumenism. The former declared that the 
Church must “read the signs of the time and interpret them in the light of the Gospel” while the latter 
called for a restoration of Christian unity. Simply put, Catholic clergy and laity had to venture outside the 
Catholic Church, whether to address the national movements of the 1960’s or work with non-
Catholics.66 The Albany Catholic Diocese would not apply the spirit of Vatican II to SUNY Albany. 
In the early 1960’s, when religious diversity at SUNY’s campus challenged the mainline 
Protestant hegemony, it also challenged the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany’s institutional power 
vested in Catholic parochial schools. The idea of Catholic students attending secular colleges, like SUNY 
Albany, was still largely foreign to Catholic clergy, and increased secularization of higher education 
during the twentieth century added to their skepticism. Thus, Catholic religious leaders felt threatened 
by secular institutions and saw parochial schools as the answer to, and an integral part in, maintaining 
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Catholic institutional authority.67 The Albany Diocese was no different. It did not get involved with SUNY 
Albany or seek to establish a more active campus ministry, even if two out of three Catholic students 
picked independent or public institutions over Catholic colleges by 1963.68 It sought to protect Catholic 
authority by ignoring secular SUNY Albany altogether and letting the Newman Club maintain Catholicism 
at the University. As a result, Newman members became closer to 1960’s social issues and student 
culture while the Diocese pushed itself further away.  
Newman clubs were campus faith groups established in the early 1800’s to promote the 
“intellectual, moral, social and religious standards” excluded from secular education.69 Essentially, they 
meant to help Catholic students follow their faith while attending secular schools under the guidance of 
a chaplain priest. Although local church dioceses provided Newman chaplains, Newman was a student 
organization and chaplain priests remained separated from their diocesan provider. In 1960, when SUNY 
Albany expanded to its new campus and its growing secular presence challenged Catholic institutional 
authority, Bishop William Scully of Albany responded by personally writing to Catholic students 
attending the University telling them to join the Newman Club: 
You are presently listed as a student of a secular college. Undoubtedly, you have good reasons for 
attending such an institution. Permit me, therefore, to remind you that from past experiences we 
know that you will have to face a serious challenge to your Catholic faith – a challenge which may 
affect your future moral life and perhaps endanger your eternal salvation.70 
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In other words, while the CACC altered their ministry in the face of student threats, Bishop Scully 
stepped away from the campus and simply instructed Catholic students to become Newman members. 
The bishop felt threatened by the fact that Catholics were attending secular universities and not Catholic 
schools (such as Siena College or Saint Rose, to provide local examples), yet he had no intention of 
maintaining Catholic authority through an involved campus ministry program. To him, it was best to 
remained isolated from the campus while Newman took over. Even when given a second opportunity to 
get on campus, Scully declined. In 1963, he met with the CACC regarding an interfaith campus ministry 
at SUNY and despite expressing “definite interest,” Scully still told the mainline Protestants to “take the 
initiative.”71 When confronted by authority threats from SUNY’s campus, the Albany Diocese reacted 
through a policy of avoidance with the hope to thereby protect its institutional authority from secular 
concerns. 
 Consequently, it would be Newman dealing with the cultural changes of the 1960’s. Similar to 
the Capital Area Council of Churches, Newman realized early on that campus ministry rooted in 
Catholicism would not survive, and the club quickly adapted thereafter. In 1963, the Rensselaer 
Newman Association proposed the building of a Newman Center at a smaller, private institution in 
Albany, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI).72 Through the Development Direction Inc., it conducted a 
study to determine whether or not the Center, which centralized Newman chaplains and represented a 
stronger commitment to Catholic teaching, would be economically feasible. Respondents to the project 
agreed it was too ambitious and that chaplains needed a pastoral role on campus, with one respondent 
saying “If I were a Catholic parent worried about my child retaining his faith at a secular university, I 
would simply send him to a Catholic college.”73 Simply put, Catholics were insufficiently concerned with 
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religious ministries and preferred pastoral services to address relevant concerns, most of which being 
secular. Some even claimed a Catholic ministry “would prove hurtfully competitive with the high 
technical standards.”74 Catholics were moving beyond theology-based education and as a result, 
Newman clubs ventured outside the Catholic Church.  
From 1964 to 1965, SUNY Albany’s Newman Club moved beyond the goal of maintaining 
Catholicism on campus to connect with students of other faiths. During the academic year, Newman 
members worked with Reverend Frank Snow and the Protestant group, the Campus Christian Council, 
on several occasions. They co-sponsored an ecumenical Bible study and held two ecumenical prayer 
services for Ash Wednesday and the Advent season, making it “the first time Catholics and Protestants 
at Albany State prayed together.”75 Compared to the Albany Catholic Diocese, whose members did not 
form an official commission on ecumenism until 1967, the Newman Club was truly ahead of its time for 
reaching out to non-Catholics. Better yet, some of these students recalled their interfaith collaboration 
as “the highlight of the year,” implying that they wanted to continue working with their Protestant 
counterparts.76 By interacting with non-Catholic religious organizations and ministers, the Newman Club 
reflected the mission Vatican II and the changes happening on SUNY Albany’s campus. The campus was 
becoming more diverse and Newman members knew the importance of stepping outside Catholicism’s 
borders to relate to students, unlike the Albany Catholic Diocese down the street.  
Since the late 1960’s saw radical cultural and political change, the Albany Newman Club 
addressed secular concerns more aggressively. In early 1967, the Newman members collaborated with 
the Church of the University, a Protestant organization created under the Capital Area Council of 
Churches, to sponsor courses in theology for SUNY Albany students. Some classes included “A New Basis 
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for Sexual Morality,” which was given by CACC campus minister Reverend Small, and “Revelation-
Genesis and Modern Science-Evolution.”77 As pointed out before, Bishop William Scully detested secular 
education, and partly for having classes on modern science that challenged Christian teaching. Yet, 
Newman members actively engaged the topic in addition to changing sexual norms, as hinted by the 
title “A New Basis for Sexual Morality.”78 They went from ecumenism and working with Protestants to 
secular issues. As best put by one member, “…Newman has become an action minded group involved 
with the social, cultural, educational…aspects of a student’s life.”79 Similar to the CACC, the 
radicalization of student culture transformed the Newman Club into an organization dominated by 
secular concerns. By 1969 its agenda incorporated a talk on birth control, co-ed mixers, and discussions 
on popular music, all in an effort to connect with students, Catholic or not. At this point, the Newman 
Club had completely divorced itself from the mission of establishing Catholicism and became a student 
group.80 In doing so, it enabled the Albany Catholic Diocese to stay isolated from the cultural changes 
taking place on Albany’s campus during the late 1960’s. At the same time, it no longer upheld 
Catholicism, as would be the case with many Catholic students, even those at Catholic colleges and 
universities. 
The Albany Catholic Diocese’s ministries at local religious or private colleges demonstrated how 
obsolete its authority had become to Catholic students and the growing secular world. Even on the 
predominately Catholic campuses, Diocesan ministers struggled to remain relevant.81 In the 1969- 1970 
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Summery Report on Campus Ministry, the Diocesan Director, Reverend Ferdinand Ermlich, summarized 
their struggles: 
In a very short period of its recent history, campus ministry within the Diocese of Albany has 
witnessed a great range of activities…. and even deliberate attempts to promote anarchy.  
Many of us have attempted to remain “in” on what is going on but that position becomes 
impossible in trying to follow the latest curve, peak or valley the college community chooses.82  
In other words, Albany Catholic Diocese’s authority vested in the parochial system could not avoid the 
cultural changes represented by SUNY Albany and other secular institutions. Catholic students at 
Catholic colleges participated in anti-war demonstrations and Black Power protests, and the Albany 
Diocese had little clue in how to respond to their “anarchy.” To compare, Reverend William Small 
understood students’ frustration over “the System” and tried to adapt campus ministry, but Reverend 
Ermlich couldn’t even pinpoint the source of their upset, let alone justify their behavior.83 Such 
cluelessness manifested in solutions based in theology only, with one campus minister trying to bridge 
the Church and university community though a Sunday Evening Eucharist.84 This approach was taken by 
CACC and the Newman Club in the early 1960’s when SUNY Albany’s campus posed religious diversity. 
The Albany Catholic Diocese had an ill-informed approach to say the least. 
Since the Albany Catholic Diocese isolated itself from secular concerns and campuses, it only 
knew how to relate its authority to Catholic issues, hence the theological approach. It did not have the 
experience of the CACC and the Newman Club to develop campus ministry programs rooted in secular 
concerns related to current student culture. Naturally, the Albany Catholic Diocese would fail in its 
approach to campus unrest. In the 1969- 1970 Summery Report, the Diocesan campus minister noted 
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that ministry to black students and sub groups were “hit and miss” and there was a “sharp decrease of 
interest” in Catholic programs and faith instruction among university students.85 Reverend Ermlich even 
wrote to Bishop Edwin Broderick of the Albany Diocese, saying that he (Ermlich) “being white, blond, 
blue-eyed, and German had little credibility.… [in] resolving the hate within the black community.”86 He 
then called on the bishop to find a black clergyman to instead fulfill that aspect of his ministry duty.87 To 
put briefly, Reverend Ermlich approached campus unrest through a Catholic campus ministry with the 
hopes of maintaining authority. Once realizing his ineffectiveness in solving secular issues, such as race 
and student activism, he called on Bishop Broderick to find someone else more qualified. Ermlich was 
unable to convey the Catholic institutional authority he represented in the face of rising secularism and 
unrest. The Albany Catholic Diocese spent the past decade isolated from the cultural changes of the 
1960’s and it was obvious its institutional authority had become irrelevant to the many Catholics 
undergoing such changes.  
The Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany differed dramatically from Capital Area Council of 
Churches in its approach to campus ministry. Up until Vatican II, Catholicism discouraged activism in 
non-churchly matters and campus ministries at secular institutions. Thus, the Diocese was uninvolved 
with campus ministry and delegated the Newman Club the responsibility to maintain Catholicism at 
SUNY Albany and other non-Catholic universities. This caused the Albany Diocese to inadvertently push 
Newman Club members closer to secular student concerns and away from the original goal of 
establishing Catholicism, while it stayed away from the controversial issues brought on by campus 
unrest. Consequently, the Diocese could no longer relate its institutional authority to Catholic laypeople. 
Despite their opposite approaches, the Albany Catholic Diocese and the Capital Area Council of Churches 
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both failed to maintain authority in the face of campus unrest. It makes sense the two united in 1973 
when the Diocese officially joined the ecumenical organization. 
 
Off Campus: Civil Rights, the CACC, and the Albany Catholic Diocese 
 
Off SUNY Albany’s campus, black civil rights posed additional challenges to the Capital Area 
Council of Churches. In the early 1960’s, the Civil Rights Movement represented a moment of change in 
the United States, so long as it was within the liberal consensus. The liberal consensus characterized 
American politics during the mid-20th century and consisted of five principles, two of the most important 
being that American society, as it stood, did not have major problems and any problems it did have 
could be solved through incremental reform. The Movement fit nicely within the parameters of the 
liberal consensus. It aimed to bring down de jure segregation in Southern states through Civil Rights 
legislation and activists used strategies of non-violent protests and “sit-ins” to attain their goal. 
Therefore, the Civil Rights Movement did not severely threaten the Capital Area Council of Churches’ 
white authority anchored by the liberal consensus, making it easier for the organization to support Civil 
Rights efforts. During the early 1960’s, CACC members were very involved in the Movement on a 
national and local scale, and their activism was pivotal in the passing of the Civil Rights Act and the 
Voting Rights Act. Once the Movement split between more conservative Civil Rights activists, such as 
those in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and radical activists in the Students Non-Violent 
Coordinating Committee, black civil rights began calling for structural change. President Johnson’s War 
on Poverty programs and the subsequent outbreak of urban rioting highlighted this transformation, all 
of which threatened white authority and the liberal consensus.88 As the CACC progressively engaged 
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with black civil rights activism, and attempted to provide opportunities for black leadership, it became 
increasingly uncomfortable with the idea of losing authority to black leaders. Similar to campus unrest, 
the CACC sought to immerse itself among authority threats in an effort to maintain power. Also similar 
to campus unrest, it withdrew from the cause altogether in 1970 following collaboration with black 
clergy, signifying its biggest fear realized.  
In the early 1960’s, the Capital Area Council was very involved in the Civil Rights Movement. The 
Movement indicated change for America and such change meant activist involvement to maintain 
relevancy, and thus authority, for the CACC. To do so, it often collaborated with the National Council of 
Churches (NCC), which had considerable political connections. In 1963, the NCC mobilized religious 
leaders across the country for the March on Washington, the pivotal event when over 200,000 
Americans gathered in Washington, D.C. to pressure legislators to pass a Civil Rights bill. Members also 
lobbied in Washington and wrote letters to Congress until a Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964.89 CACC 
members contributed to these national efforts: Thirteen attended the March on Washington and several 
attended the meetings in D.C. preparing for the event.90 By participating in the Washington affairs, the 
CACC lived out the mainline Protestant belief of authority and social change being inextricably linked. 
Back at home, it was just as active.91 In 1963, the CACC added the Department of Social Education and 
Action to support Civil Rights efforts.92 It called on members to inform government representatives 
about the Civil Rights bill while the Department itself met with local religious leaders to persuade other 
denominations to “write their senators in Washington” about the bill.93 Whether it was through the 
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National Council of Churches or activist efforts in Albany, the CACC was very involved in the Civil Rights 
Movement. It was easier for members to be engaged and supportive because the Movement, although 
calling for legal change, did not challenge their white authority within the liberal consensus. As the 
1960’s progressed, the balance between white authority and black civil rights activism became harder 
for the CACC to maintain.  
In addition to Civil Rights legislation, the Great Society and War on Poverty programs sought to 
address black civil rights during the 1960’s and affected the Capital Area Council of Churches own 
approach to the cause. President Lyndon Johnson understood that dismantling legal segregation in the 
South did not address racism and poverty issues in the North, and hope that with the Great Society and 
War on Poverty, he could improve the lives of all Americans (within the liberal consensus of course). 
From 1964 to 1965, federal aid went towards numerous programs related to education, job training, 
healthcare (Medicaid, Medicare), and even arts and cultural centers. The idea was to alleviate poverty 
by providing certain resources rather than through income redistribution.94 Acting as the centerpiece of 
the War on Poverty was the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act. The act established the Office of Economic 
Opportunity and Community Action Programs (CAPs), the latter of which intended to give poor and 
minority residents a say in how federal funding should be spent in their communities.95 The Great 
Society programs represented the federal government’s attempt to help the poor within the liberal 
consensus and the shift from abolishing Jim Crow to abolishing inner city poverty. This pushed the 
Capital Area Council of Churches to establish a platform in touch with the War on Poverty, but it also 
brought the organization closer to the reality that the dynamic between white and black authority was 
changing.  
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In 1965, the Capital Area Council of Churches announced the creation of “the most dramatic, 
most effective community program to be known in Albany,” the Inter-Faith Task Force.96 During the 
summers of 1965 and 1966, the Inter-Faith Task Force brought religious leaders from the CACC, the 
Jewish community, and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany to rebuild and improve inner city Albany. 
More significantly, it meant to foster community leadership, as with the Community Action Programs. 
The Inter-Faith Task Force encouraged “the organization of block organizations, led by residents” that 
together regularly sought enforcement of housing codes, street cleanliness, and removal of vacant or 
unsightly lots.97 In doing so, it hoped to instill “a sense of dignity and hope” within poor 
neighborhoods.98 The Inter-Faith Task Force was essential for several reasons. First, it gave inner city 
residents leadership opportunities. The lobbying efforts of the early 1960’s went towards legislation 
benefitting African Americans, but did not provide spaces for black leadership nor target Northern 
racism. Second, the Inter-Faith Task Force worked directly with black Albany residents, which 
demonstrated the increased involvement of CACC members. There was clearly a difference between 
sending letters to senators about a Civil Rights bill and spending hot summer days picking up trash in 
downtown Albany. Even so, the CACC created the Inter-Faith Task Force out of fear of declining white 
leadership.  
When the Inter-Faith Task Force empowered downtown Albany residents, the CACC’s Social 
Education and Action Department sought leadership in black civil rights from conventional authority 
figures. Albany’s local government had not pursued federal funding from the Economic Opportunity Act 
to create a Community Action Program, so members in the Social Education and Action Department 
wrote to county legislators about the funds. They also met with local bankers, real estate agents, and 
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insurance agents to discuss housing options for minority groups in Albany.99 The discrepancy between 
the Inter-Faith Task Force and the Social Education and Action Department demonstrated the difficulty 
of simultaneously maintaining white authority and relevancy to the changing national stage. Both 
programs were part of the CACC and created in support of black civil rights, but the Social Education and 
Action Department canceled out the leadership mission of the Inter-Faith Task Force. Department 
members collaborated with local leaders to develop housing plans for minority residents living 
downtown. In essence, they laid out the preferred steps for the block organizations to take. The Inter-
Faith Task Force organized community groups led by residents and encouraged them to seek justice in 
housing codes, vacant lots, and other neighborhood issues. Behind the scenes, the Social Education and 
Action Department had already negotiated with the necessary personnel to take control, effectively 
undercutting the community leadership promoted by the Inter-Faith Task Force. The CACC felt 
threatened by declining white authority. It would engage in Civil Rights activism, but only to a certain 
extent.  
The CACC was beginning to experience what the National Council of Churches did in 1964. The 
NCC’s work behind the 1964 Freedom Summer meant to unify blacks and whites in the fight for African 
American voting rights in the South, but significant power struggles broke out between black and white 
participants. Even before the Freedom Summer began, divisions formed. The previous spring, the NCC 
worked with SNCC and SCLC staffers to hold an orientation session for Northern students and attempted 
to have a supervisory role. In theory it wanted to let the black leaders train students since they 
experienced racism first hand, but some church leaders in the NCC opposed this exchange of power. In 
fact, the NCC general secretary, Edwin Epsy, gave all the names of those at the orientation sessions to 
the FBI as proof of subversive activity in black groups.100 Ironically, the Freedom Summer meant to 
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empower African Americans and their quest for voting rights, yet Epsy, a NCC leader, turned in the 
names of the people he was supposed to be helping. The Civil Rights activism of NCC members was 
genuine as long as their white authority remained unthreatened by black leadership. Once the focus of 
black civil rights went from legal equality to social equality, such threats were difficult to avoid.101  
Urban rioting heightened the fears of authority institutions and transformed the meaning of 
black rights activism. During the summers of 1965 through 1968, urban rioting in predominately black 
neighborhoods broke out. The riots resulted from the strained relationship between white cops and 
black civilians, but news outlets incorrectly portrayed them as race riots and labeled black rioters as 
“thugs,” which fed into white suspicion and the fear of declining authority.102 More importantly, urban 
rioting attracted national attention to de facto segregation and police relations in inner cities that went 
unresolved by the Great Society and the War on Poverty. President Johnson created the programs to 
specifically improve poor, inner city America, and yet people living in those areas were rebelling. The 
riots made Johnson and other conventional authority figures realize that urban issues could not be 
solved by legislation or any other method within the liberal consensus; they required structural change. 
Henceforth, the Capital Area Council of Churches struggled immensely with black civil rights as structural 
change clearly indicated the decline of white authority. 
From 1967 to 1970, Capital Area Council of Churches could no longer balance engagement in 
black civil rights while holding onto white power. Related activism called for increased black leadership, 
and many whites distrusted that idea, including those in the CACC. Their distrust manifested in classes 
given by the CACC, such as “Poverty, the Urban Crisis and the Church” and “The Black Revolution: 
What’s Happening to Black People in America Today and the Consequences for the Larger Society.”103 
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The classes indicated two things. First, based on the title of the second one, the CACC felt extremely 
threatened. The phrase “Black Revolution” characterized black civil rights as dangerous and violent 
while “Consequences for the Larger Society” implied it as destructive to whites since they made up the 
larger society. Second, the CACC held classes in place of active engagement, despite the Social Education 
and Action Department Chairman saying  “…the educative value of such a workshop is difficult to 
assess…the magnitude of the problems facing our cities.”104 The CACC was conflicted. It did not want to 
give up its white power, but it also felt compelled to address social issues, given its authority vested in 
social justice and the changing needs of society. It realized that to engage in black civil rights, it could no 
longer be a leader. In 1969, the Social Education and Action Department began having monthly 
breakfasts with clergy from all over the Capital Region to ensure that “black and white leadership” was 
presented.105 The Department’s new objective represented lost authority to black clergy and the lunches 
admitted the CACC’s having lost control over black civil rights.  
The early 1970’s depict an activist retreat for the Capital Area Council of Churches. The only 
project it organized related to black civil rights was promoting a special viewing of a Martin Luther King 
Junior documentary as part of a nationwide tribute. Through the National Council of Churches, it 
secured a movie theater for the viewing while members delivered tickets to people and publicized the 
event. Their “intensive campaign” paid off, with over 1,000 people attending the viewing and raising 
$5,000 for the M.L.K. Jr. Special Fund that went towards work against poverty, racial injustice, and 
illiteracy.106 Even though this activism was ostensibly in support of black civil rights, the CACC was mainly 
just participating in a national effort honoring Dr. King. For the most part, it retracted from the cause, 
going from the March on Washington to movie nights on Madison Avenue.  
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The Capital Area Council of Churches’ approach to black civil rights reflected an authority crisis 
experienced by many conventional authority figures throughout the 1960’s. During the Civil Rights 
Movement, CACC members actively pursued solutions to segregation because the Movement instilled 
change through legal means and established systems. It did not threaten authority of CACC members 
living in the North. When the national focus transitioned to the War on Poverty, the CACC formed the 
Inter-Faith Task Force, which strongly mirrored Johnson’s Economic Opportunity Act. Although both 
programs had a community-based approach to poverty, they still put control in the hands of the 
government or the CACC, and not black leaders. Urban rioting revealed the pitfalls of Johnson’s Great 
Society and more importantly, declining white authority. Legislation and anti-poverty programs failed to 
handle race problems and new solutions meant putting blacks in charge of institutions. The CACC thus 
downgraded activist efforts, but only after working with black clergy, indicating a loss of white authority 
to African American churches. By the early 1970’s, the CACC rarely participated in black civil rights 
unless it was part of national phenomenon.  
Albany Catholic Diocese had a difference experience from the CACC and refrained from direct 
involvement with the Civil Rights Movement in order to protect its institutional authority. During the 
1960’s, Civil Rights activism had come to represent the cultural changes within American Catholicism. 
Catholic liberals started questioning the parochial system inspired by their Civil Rights activism and 
Vatican II. As a result, a new emphasis on the individual and how he/she can affect the Church replaced 
how the Church, an authoritative structure, affected the individual. In addition, Vatican II politicized 
activism and transformed Catholic good works, such as helping black citizens, into political statements. 
As was the case with most dioceses, the Albany Catholic Diocese had local political connections that it 
did not want to challenge through overt black civil rights activism.107 Thus, in the early 1960’s, the 
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Albany Catholic Diocese chose to step around the race issue to maintain its local authority. It supported 
Civil Rights efforts but remained unaffiliated with the cause, which resulted in backlash from Catholic 
liberals. After years of being pressured, one bishop created a fund that went towards inner city Albany. 
He, too, received backlash from unhappy parishioners for being overly ambitious. By 1970, the Albany 
Catholic Diocese lost legitimacy among Catholics across the political spectrum due, in part, to its 
approaches to black civil rights.  
In the early 1960’s, the Albany Catholic Diocese supported, but did not formally commit to, Civil 
Rights. Catholic liberals and clergy engaged in activist efforts through the Catholic Interracial Council of 
the Diocese of Albany (CIC).108 The CIC structurally resembled the Capital Area Council of Churches. It 
was the local branch of the National Council Conference of Interracial Justice, which consisted of other 
Catholic Interracial Councils in Northern cities, and was very active in the Civil Rights Movement. CIC 
members sent letters and telegrams urging the passing of the Civil Rights Bill, and grew from twenty-five 
people in 1963 to over two-hundred by 1965, indicating the significant amount of Catholic support 
behind Civil Rights.109 Even so, the CIC never became a department directly under the Albany Catholic 
Diocese and instead formed under the blessing of Bishop Edward Maginn, the Diocesan auxiliary 
bishop.110 The difference between the two was very important. A department would imply that the 
Albany Diocese officially committed to the Civil Rights Movement, meaning its clergy, its treasury, and 
its parishes would also be committed. A bishop’s blessing meant that the Albany Diocese supported the 
CIC and its mission, but was not making a political statement about the cause. CIC members were 
fighting on behalf of racial equality, and the Catholic Church emphasized helping one another and doing 
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good works for others. Therefore, by keeping the CIC independent with Bishop Maginn’s blessing, the 
Albany Catholic Diocese avoided official commitment to the Civil Rights Movement in an effort to 
protect its institutional authority.111 One activist priest tested this approach when he publically 
commented his take on the issue. 
In 1965, Father Bonaventure O’Brien challenged the Albany Catholic Diocese’s decision to 
remain disassociated with Civil Rights activism. The Catholic priest had spent the summer volunteering 
for the Inter-Faith Task Force, the anti-poverty program created by the Capital Area Council of Churches. 
Like other religious leaders involved in the project, O’Brien dedicated his work towards improving 
Albany’s South End community, which made him realize the necessity of such programs.112 He thus 
started pushing Albany residents to join organizations similar to the Inter-Faith Task Force. More 
drastically, he openly criticized Albany Mayor Erastus Corning for not aggressively pursuing federal 
funding from the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act to use towards ameliorating local poverty. On Election 
Day, O’Brien further broadcasted his frustration when he aided South End residents to poll watch to 
prevent infringements on their voting rights and ensure that Mayor Corning’s re-election was not a 
result of Albany machine politics. The Albany Catholic Diocese did not appreciate O’Brien’s 
outspokenness. It supported his efforts in the Inter-Faith Task Force, committing both personnel and 
funding for the project, but the priest crossed a line by making overt political statements and interfering 
with local politics. In response, the Diocese silenced Father O’Brien, even though the idea of Catholic 
good works was all about improving the lives of the poor.113  
The Albany Catholic Diocese failed to recognize the growing power of Catholic liberals during the 
1960’s. When it silenced Father Bonaventure O’Brien, it received backlash from the Catholic community 
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that diminished its institutional authority. Upon hearing the request for O’Brien’s departure, the 
Catholic Interracial Council argued that the Diocese contradicted Catholic teaching. CIC members 
referenced Saint Francis of Assisi as proof that Catholic troublemakers not only deserved forgiveness, 
but also can still live a saintly life.114 Prior to the incident, the Albany Diocese went unquestioned by the 
CIC. Bishop Maginn gave his blessing to the organization while Bishop William Scully, the same person 
who silenced O’Brien, received a letter expressing the “[CIC’s] gratitude for his support… and for the 
support received from the Chancery office.”115 Now, the Diocese was being challenged and criticized by 
the same Catholics. It was true the Civil Rights Movement inspired Catholic liberals across the country to 
rethink the parochial hierarchy, but for Albany Catholics the catalyst came from Father O’Brien. In 
addition to the CIC, four-hundred students at Siena College expressed their discontent with the Diocese 
by gathering for a prayer service honoring the activist priest.116 The Albany Catholic Diocese continued to 
lose institutional authority over its inaction over black civil rights.  
As the 1960’s went on, the Albany Catholic Diocese faced more scrutiny from Catholics unhappy 
with its hands-off approach to black civil rights. Following Vatican II, Catholic clergy and institutions were 
expected to be activists outside the Church. The Diocese failed to apply the new mindset, and many 
Catholics noticed its failure to do so. After a year of inaction, CIC president called on Bishop Maginn to 
solve the “Catholic Dilemma,” that is, adhering to Catholic tradition in light of changing times. Vatican II 
posed difficulties and confusion for Catholics, especially since the pope now called for engagement 
outside the Church after denouncing secularism and ecumenism for hundreds of years. Thus, the CIC 
president pressured Diocesan officials for help, additionally stating that he “cannot overstress the 
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importance of the visible involvement of not only [Maginn], but all priests and religious.”117 The CIC’s 
request that all the Diocesan priests handle this concept of a modern Catholic Church indicated that 
many Catholics, not just liberal Catholics, wrestled with Vatican II changes, meaning they at least 
recognized them. For the Albany Catholic Diocese to remain relevant to its parishioners, it needed to 
change as well. Catholics sought guidance balancing the old Catholic Church with the new, but the 
Diocese was still stuck in the former, unwilling to address the latter. Moreover, the CIC also requested 
that Bishop Maginn hold a public forum on low-income housing in Albany because “a direct approach to 
the public... [was] the only means which will produce significant results.”118 On top of adjusting the 
Diocese to modern times, the CIC wanted Maginn to formally commit to black civil rights and use the 
Church to facilitate activism. This request challenged the Albany Diocese, whose leaders silenced Father 
Bonaventure O’Brien for doing the same thing. The pressure placed on Maginn from CIC members, 
Vatican II changes, and the overall Catholic population drove him towards more active involvement.  
In 1968, Bishop Maginn developed a more ambitious plan regarding black civil rights activism: 
The Diocesan Development Fund. It committed $100,000 of Diocesan funds towards improving black 
neighborhoods so that Catholic liberals and Vatican II enthusiasts couldn’t criticize the Albany Diocese 
for inaction. As with the case of campus unrest, Maginn delegated responsibilities to another party. He 
created the Diocesan Commission for Racial Justice to determine how to allocate the funds and the 
team came up with over ten local organizations that benefitted inner city residents: $30,000 went to 
three organizations for housing, $25,000 divided among childcare facilities, $12,500 for centers of 
rehabilitation, and the rest went to education and supporting free legal services.119 In essence, the 
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Diocesan Development Fund gave institutions money with the hopes that they in turn would help inner 
city Albany and carry out the Albany Catholic Diocese’s mission. Neither Maginn nor the Diocesan 
Commission for Racial Justice would physically take part in the activism. Ironically enough, Maginn still 
failed in this endeavor in using $100,000 from the Diocese’s treasury. The bishop angered “a surprisingly 
large percentage of people in the diocese” (letters received by Maginn from Catholic laypeople were 
only “‘20 to 1’ in favor”) and received angry phone calls from parishioners against the fund.120 For 
Maginn to openly commit to black civil rights on behalf of the entire Diocese was risky given the political 
statement and amount of money involved. Unsurprisingly, the number of gifts from individuals went 
down. The institutional authority of the Diocese lost legitimacy to Catholic liberals with Father O’Brien 
and to Catholic conservatives with the Diocesan Development Fund.  
The relationship between Catholic institutional authority and black civil rights was complicated 
for the Albany Catholic Diocese. In the early 1960’s, Vatican II politicized Civil Rights activism, turning the 
performance of Catholic good works in black communities into a political statement. For this reason, the 
Albany Catholic Diocese supported the efforts of the Catholic Interracial Council, but refused to fully 
commit. Many Catholic Church Dioceses had connections to local political leaders and getting political 
jeopardized these relationships, hence the Albany Diocese’s silencing of Father O’Brien. Its inaction 
frustrated Catholic liberals and as the 1960’s progressed, the Albany Diocese was pressured to get more 
involved in the Civil Rights Movement. In order to maintain authority in the face of such pressures, 
Bishop Maginn created the Diocesan Development Fund. It committed $100,000 to bettering Albany’s 
inner city community and allocated the monies to different organizations. Despite placing the 
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responsibility on separate parties, Maginn still received heat from conservative Catholics for officially 
committing the Diocese to black civil rights through the fund.  
  
Unlikely Allies: The CACC, the Albany Diocese, and the Effects of the 60’s 
 
 The Capital Area Council of Churches and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany struggled to 
maintain authority in the face of 1960’s unrest. From SUNY students to Newman Club members, from 
the Civil Rights Movement to urban rioting, both Christian institutions lost a significant amount of 
authority by 1970. Their approaches to social issues and interpretations of authority vastly differed from 
each other, but in 1973 they came together as a last “Hail Mary” to sustain local Christianity. The tension 
between the CACC and the Albany Catholic Diocese prior to uniting revealed how desperate they were 
to join forces, especially coming from the end of the Catholics.  
In the 1960’s, the Albany Diocese’s opinions towards Protestants was skeptical at best, even 
following Vatican II’s calls for ecumenism. One reverend of the Albany Catholic Diocese perfectly 
summed it up when he said, “I grew up with a particular attitude towards other Christian communions … 
as if in some way they were evil.”121 The reverend was not alone in his feelings towards Protestant 
believers: A whole committee of Catholics in the Commission on Ecumenical and Interreligious Affairs 
expressed similar bias. In 1967, the Albany Catholic Diocese created the Ecumenical Commission to 
meet Vatican II demands for interdenominational work, but its officials blatantly ignored Protestant 
outreach and focused on relationships with other denominations.122 By its seventh meeting, the 
Ecumenical Commission had formed separate committees dedicated solely to Jewish communities and 
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Christian orthodox churches to develop “better understandings” with their followers. Two Committee 
members even went so far as to attend Jewish-Christian workshops in Chicago and Toronto, stating that 
“this area of inter-religious activity was very important for [the Diocese’s] attention.”123 For mainline 
Protestants, this type of commitment was not given.  
In the rare instance the Ecumenical Council attempted outreach to Protestants, it produced 
more conflict in the Diocese than with any other denomination. In 1969, the Ecumenical Commission 
added an ad hoc committee designated for mixed marriages between Catholics and other Christian 
denominations. Unlike those in the Jewish and Christian Orthodox committees, the Mixed Marriage 
committee members struggled with their purpose of creating marriage procedures for Christian couples 
that met the tradition of Catholicism and Protestantism.124 After six months of stalemate, Commission 
member Father Howard Hubbard recommended that “a committee of pastors and theologians, 
representing the Catholic, Episcopal, Reformed, Lutheran traditions… discuss the theology of 
marriage.”125 Simply put, it was not so much the idea of mix marriage stumping the Albany Catholic 
Diocese, but rather the level of cooperation needed between Catholic and Protestant leaders to handle 
this particular matter. The fact that Father Hubbard and other Ecumenical Commission members waited 
months before proposing to work with Protestant denominations on an issue directly involving their 
clergy and laity revealed their suspicions towards Protestants. However, after losing significant authority 
over campus unrest and black civil rights, Catholics eventually warmed up to the idea.  
In 1971, the Albany Catholic Diocese started more meaningful collaboration with Protestant 
denominations. The Mixed Marriage committee hosted joint dialogues and workshops on mixed 
marriages with the Episcopal Diocese and finalized clergy protocol for conducting mixed marriages. This 
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was a stark contrast to several years prior, when the Albany Diocese completely excluded Protestant 
leaders from the discussion. Perhaps even more indicative of changed attitudes was the Ecumenical 
Commission sending Diocesan representatives to a Reformation Rally honoring the Protestant 
Reformation at St. John’s Lutheran’s Church at the request of Pastor Alvin Butz. Shared prayer services 
were progressive enough for Catholics, but for the Diocese to support an event celebrating the creation 
of Protestantism clearly showed it wanted closer relations with Protestant churches at this time.126 By 
1972, the Ecumenical Commission began talks with the CACC regarding membership, and “the tone of 
the discussion seemed to indicate that it [was] desirable that the association between Roman Catholic 
congregations and Protestant, Episcopal, and Orthodox congregations [was] encouraged.”127 To facilitate 
the merge, the Diocese even lifted its “current restriction against membership in the council of 
churches.”128 Essentially, what the Albany Diocese understood as suspect and negative following Vatican 
II was now happening at its discretion – an alliance with Protestants.  
The Catholic-Mainline Protestant union was an international and national phenomenon. In 
addition to the Capital Area Council of Churches, the World Council of Churches and National Council of 
Churches pushed for Catholic entry into the organization. In preparation for the union,  the NCC 
published and presented “A Report on Possible Roman Catholic Membership in the NCC” in 1972 that 
studied the “Threats and Possibilities” of letting Catholic churches join.129 It concluded that both sides 
would have to overcome many areas of disagreement surrounding aid to parochial schools, the Pill, 
divorce, abortion, as well as other anxieties: For Protestants, papal influence on the NCC and decreased 
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donations from member churches against Catholic membership and, for Catholics, the loss of their 
Church’s claim to “uniqueness.”130 In sum, both denominations had to risk changes in doctrine and 
behavior into which they had previously vested their institutional authority. The CACC vested its 
authority in the context of American mainstream culture. By allowing Catholics to join, traditional beliefs 
surrounding birth control and sexuality would impede its more liberal beliefs connected to the changing 
society. The Albany Catholic Diocese would have to sacrifice its parochial schools and uniqueness, the 
two defining features of its authority. Despite knowing these setbacks, the Albany Catholic Diocese 
became an official member of the Capital Area Council of Churches in 1973. 
 During the 1960’s, conflict between the Capital Area Council of Churches and the Albany 
Catholic Diocese prevented their union. As was the case with campus unrest and the Civil Rights 
Movement, Diocesan officials hesitated to apply a Vatican II mindset to their work. They did not get 
involved with secular student affairs at SUNY Albany and waited until the late 1960’s to make an official 
statement regarding black civil rights. The mainline Protestants in the CACC were no exception to such 
treatment. The Albany Catholic Diocese struggled to draft a new protocol for marrying couples of 
different Christian denominations, and the root of its struggles came from close cooperation with 
Protestant clergy to address the matter. Nonetheless, by 1971 a more meaningful effort to collaborate 
can be seen between mainline Protestants and Catholics, leading to their merger in 1973.  
The alliance between the two Christian institutions was no coincidence. Both were confronted 
by immense pressures and challenges from 1960’s issues on-campus at SUNY Albany and off-campus in 
downtown Albany. More importantly, both failed in their endeavors to maintain authority in the face of 
such threats, even though they took opposing approaches. The CACC applied a hands-on approach to 
campus unrest, only to succumb to rising Student Power manifesting in a campus ministry program 
totally controlled by the agenda of student activists. It applied the same approach to black civil rights, 
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but realized the cause increasingly called for black leadership, and the mainline Protestants in the CACC 
could no longer hold onto their white authority. The Albany Catholic Diocese applied a hands-off 
approach, delegating campus ministry to the Newman Club and Civil Rights activism to the Catholic 
Interracial Council. Neither were directly associated with the Albany Catholic Diocese because Diocesan 
leaders did not want to associate the Diocese with secularism and overt political statements, both of 
which threatened Catholic institutional authority in Albany. By 1970, the Albany Diocese was in the 
same weakened state of the CACC, yet this time it was for lack of involvement in 1960’s issues.   
 Regardless of the approach taken to quell authority threats, the loss of institutional authority 
was most likely going to occur during the 1960’s. Furthermore, the fact that the Albany Diocese went 
from avoiding mainline Protestants to joining the Capital Area Council of Churches, proved that the 
authority loss of these two institutions was considerable, especially in the small timeframe of 1965 to 
1970. The 1960’s decade was historic for many reasons. Most notably, it was historic for showing how a 
generation of people, and their rallying cry of “question authority,” significantly transformed modern 
American society. The Baby Boom cohort will continue to shape American history and wield its power no 
longer through conventional authority institutions such as the Government and the Church.  
 
